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Abstract    This article reviews the recently published biography of Karl Marx 
by Jonathan Sperber, Curator’s Professor of History at the University of Mis-
souri.   It notes how, in making full use of the documentary material assembled 
by the MEGA project, Sperber is able to set Marx in his historical context and 
better explain the course that he charted, particularly in the revolutionary years 
of 1848–49.   It suggests, however, that there is a cost to this, since Sperber’s 
detailed and sensitive grasp of the times is not always balanced by similar qual-
ity of insight into the nature of the man himself, especially in key areas like the 
source of his atheism and the significance of his relationships with the women in 
his life.   Considerable use is therefore made of the work of other writers, most 
notably Thomas Masaryk, in an attempt to discern the deeper significance of 
some of the evidence that Sperber has assembled.   The problem of accounting 
for the anger that permeated Marx’s thinking and writing is addressed, and a 
picture drawn of an individual who found it exceptionally difficult to come to 
terms with any form of restraint on his behaviour or thought.   The significance 
of the turbid nature of his thought for the twentieth century is explored and an 
attempt made to assess the degree of his responsibility for the impact that Marx-
ism had on countries such as Russia and China after his death. 
Jonathan Sperber. 2013. Karl Marx: A Nineteenth-Century Life. New York, 
Liveright Publishing Corporation. Pp. xx, 648. ISBN 978 0 87140 467 1 
(hardback).
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Setting out to write his major study of Marx more than a century ago, 
Thomas Masaryk was conscious that the resources he needed for a full un-
derstanding of his subject were not yet available; ‘…many of Marx’s impor-
tant works are not widely accessible…A critical edition of all of Marx’s earli-
er works would add to his stature as a thinker, and would definitely help us 
know him better…It is, of course, also unfortunate that we lack a detailed 
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biography’ (1972, p. 29).1  According to Jonathan Sperber, the most recent in 
a long line of historians who have tried to tell the story of Marx’s life, those 
gaps in the scholarly foundations have now mostly been filled.   True, the 
Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, the project to publish the complete writings of 
Marx and Engels, begun as far back as the 1920’s, is still on-going (it is usu-
ally known by its acronym, MEGA, which, given the titanism of the duo 
whose works it enshrines, is deliciously, if unintentionally, appropriate). 
But its work on the factual base is already extensive enough, Sperber be-
lieves, to allow the superstructure of interpretation to be erected with genu-
ine confidence.   Even so, he warns us at the outset, we should moderate our 
expectations; the MEGA material is unlikely to revolutionize our view of 
Marx.   Are not the seemingly meagre results of so much endeavour cause 
for disappointment?  No, Sperber reassures us, for whatever the changes 
that can now be made to Marx’s portrait may lack in excitement, they more 
than make up for in substance.   ‘This new source contains no smoking gun, 
no single document that completely alters existing understandings of Marx; 
but it does bring to light hundreds of small details that subtly change our 
picture of him’ (p. xiv).   Today, then, if we are patient, we can learn a great 
deal more about Marx, factually, than could Masaryk.   Information has ac-
cumulated like sediment in the interim; the passage of time and the labor 
of many hands have worked to give us this advantage over he who went 
before.   
Yet knowledge, information pure and simple, is not the only, or indeed 
the main, factor that conditions and deepens historical understanding.   The 
factual material has also to be digested and assimilated, and this requires 
insight; at root, what matters most is not weight of evidence in and of itself, 
but what we make of it, the significance we discern in it.   And insight can-
not be aggregated, it has to be achieved afresh in each generation — or not, 
as the case may be — so that progress here is far from automatic, far from 
inevitable.   This point is implicit in the criticism that Masaryk levelled 
against Marx’s own handling of history.
A genuinely scientific history must meet two requirements.   
One was taken for granted even in Marx’s time: history, like all the 
1.  As Erazim Kohák, the editor and translator of this study by Masaryk, notes (1972, pp. 
16-17), it was originally published in Czech in 1898, and went through various revisions.  Ma-
saryk’s concerns about the documentary lacunae may have faded somewhat with the passage 
of time, but they remained valid in 1936 when the fifth and final Czech edition appeared.  Ko-
hák’s 1972 abridged translation of this edition made the work available to English readers for 
the first time, but its date of publication should not, of course, be taken as that of the original 
work’s conception and revision.
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sciences, must cling rigorously to experience; it must be genuinely 
realistic, if this means careful noting of individual facts.   Second, it 
must also present an explanation of the meaning of the facts it re-
cords — history cannot be simply a careful catalogue of facts, a col-
lection of “human documents,” but rather also an explanation of in-
dividual facts and documents, their origin, and their significance for 
man and society.   We express this methodologically in our demand 
for a history built on sociological and philosophical foundations. 
  Marx — rightly — has such a foundation.   He builds his his-
tory on his materialism.   But this philosophical foundation is not 
scientifically acceptable.   Materialism does not provide the historian 
with an adequate psychology, and without a psychology…a correct 
interpretation of historical facts is impossible. (1972,  pp. 119–120)
 And Masaryk’s axioms hold true not just for Marx, but for all who 
write about the past; the quality of insight embodied in an historical study 
is directly related to the ‘philosophical foundation’ that underpins it.   A 
work of history may ostensibly concern itself only with its subject, but it 
also serves as a self-judgment, revealing the historian’s depth of under-
standing of reality, grasp of psychology, and so on.   Any deficiencies in 
these broader areas will vitiate the quality of the work produced, regardless 
of the quantity of evidence on which judgment is being exercised. 
For none is this truer than for biographers of Marx, given that their 
central task is to find the underlying connections between the man’s life 
and his ideas.   For Marx’s ‘philosophical foundations’ were clearly not just 
a matter of pure thought — passion, amounting not infrequently to vio-
lence, characterised both their essence and the manner of their expression. 
They are evidence of the working of something deeply personal, deeply 
hidden.   In the concluding sentences of his study, Jonathan Sperber rightly 
highlights the nature and importance of this for any understanding of 
Marx’s legacy. 
Marx’s actual ideas and political practice — developed in the 
matrix of the early nineteenth century, the age of the French Revo-
lution and its aftermath, of Hegel’s philosophy and its Young Hege-
lian critics, of the early industrialization of Great Britain and the 
theories of political economy emerging from them — had, at most, 
only partial connections with the ones his latter-day friends and en-
emies found in his writings.   In some ways, the actual intellectual 
connections were beside the point.   Marx’s passionately irreconcil-
able, uncompromising, and intransigent nature has been the feature 
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of his life that has had the deepest and most resonant appeal, and 
has generated the sharpest rebukes and opposition, down to the 
present day. (p. 560)
  
But aside from the legacy, we have also to consider the man himself. 
Were the irreconcilable, the uncompromising and the intransigent ele-
ments within him, elements that had such an effect on others, present from 
the moment of conception?   Was nature alone responsible, his life being 
simply the unfolding of the predetermined?   Nurture surely played its 
part too, and so we are drawn ineluctably to ask how, and how far, those 
circumstances of Marx’s time to which Sperber rightly draws attention, the 
impact of the French Revolution and the rest, conditioned the course of his 
life.   Naturally no complete, no final answer is within our grasp, for we 
will never be privy to Marx’s innermost life — there is no diary of his most 
personal thoughts, and even if one ever existed and were miraculously to 
surface, it would not answer every question.   For while Marx certainly did 
not understand so much about the world on which he exercised his thought, 
he understood even less about himself — and this not least because, while 
savagely critical of so many others, he lacked any appetite for self-criticism. 
In his analysis of late 19th century Marxism, Masaryk noted how ‘Criticism 
without self-criticism is dangerous’ (1972, p. 330), and this holds just as true 
for any and every individual, including Marx, as it does for mass move-
ments.2 
Marx’s blindness to his own nature was especially dangerous when it 
came to dealing with his dominant character trait, his tendency to feel and 
to indulge anger.   Masaryk recognized this trait, and was generous and 
insightful enough to try to explain it in terms that invoke more than just 
personality defects.
Marx is first and foremost a partisan.   He has no sense of gen-
eral solidarity.   His revolutionary wrath reinforces his antisocial 
feelings and feeds even hatred.   I realize clearly and fully that this 
2.  In explaining how Marx ‘took his own previous views and projected them on to other 
thinkers, where he could then reject them without have to criticize himself’ (p. 172), Sper-
ber might appear to be endorsing this view of Marx’s character.  Contending that this ‘was 
the only form of self-criticism that his personality would allow, and one that enabled him to 
maintain his position as the person articulating the direction of history’ (loc. cit.), he cites The 
Eighteenth Brumaire as ‘a particularly drastic example of Marx’s practice of engaging in self-
criticism through the criticism of others’ (p. 287), and refers to other examples of his ‘implicit’ 
self-criticism (p. 251).  The only objection to all of this is that Marx’s repeated U-turns simply 
do not deserve to be dignified with the name of self-criticism, for there was no recognition, let 
alone acknowledgement, of error whatsoever.  The self was not being criticized but, yet again, 
deceived.  
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brutality is no worse than the perfumed indifference of the upper 
classes.   Coarse ethical materialism is really at home precisely in 
these classes, and Marx takes his philosophical materialism from 
bourgeois philosophers… (1972, pp. 330–331)
So, in the first place, Masaryk contends, Marx was conditioned by a 
degenerate culture (though this cannot be allowed to pass completely un-
questioned.   Was Marx denied any real choice here?   Was the conditioning 
of his environment truly inescapable?  Was its coarseness so overwhelming 
as to render it totally irresistible?).   
Then there is the question of Marx’s family background.   Here, too, 
Masaryk is understanding and, in measure, sympathetic.
Marx is a heretic, an arch-heretic, by temperament.
In part, Marx would be disposed in this direction by his na-
tionality.   The pressure that his parents and he had to withstand as 
Jews would early have had the same effect as exile later.   Bernstein 
points to the influence of Jewish origins and social status for un-
derstanding Lassalle.   I believe the same holds for Marx… (1972, p. 
332)
We shall return to this important issue shortly, but first we should note 
another factor that is held to have contributed to Marx’s characteristic an-
ger.   Here again Masaryk points us in the right direction.
There are a number of answers to the question of what philo-
sophical and literary influences shaped Marx’s mind…which intel-
lectual trends of his time Marx followed, whom and what he found 
congenial.   To me it seems significant that Marx liked Heine and 
his works, especially since Marx himself was serious in tempera-
ment…I consider Marx’s fondness for Heine evidence of that special 
bitterness, of that partly anarchistic mood.   Marx is totally devoid 
of humor, but he has a generous allowance of Schopenhauer’s anger.
This temperament is already manifest in his first articles.   I 
would cite particularly his article on the Jewish question and his 
articles in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher [Franco-German Yearbooks] 
generally.   His works are full of criticism and warfare, frequently 
against his former friends. (1972, pp. 332–3)
Marx is allowed to appear here as in some degree the victim of what 
he read.   And it is true, with other mentors he might have developed dif-
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ferently.   But we should still not overlook the element of choice available to 
him; in later life, for example, Marx could declaim from Shakespeare and 
Goethe for his children (p. 297).   Was there nothing essential to be learned 
from them?  Did they teach him historical materialism?  In the final analysis, 
we surely have to admit that he followed in philosophy and literature what 
he found most congenial, not what was forced on him.
All of this relates to the young Marx, to his family origins, the charac-
ter of the cultural milieu within which he grew to maturity, and his forma-
tive encounters with philosophy.   How far is Masaryk’s analysis of those 
early years, an analysis that is now more than a century old, confirmed by 
the evidence available to Jonathan Sperber today?
On the fact that Marx was an ‘angry young man’ there is little dis-
agreement, as is clear in Sperber’s account of Marx’s debut as a writer in the 
Rhineland News.
Two long essays of his appeared in the spring and summer of 
1842, Marx’s first foray into the public sphere…At least as impres-
sive as the content of these essays was their style — angry, sarcastic, 
and polemical, not features of Marx’s previous writings…Marx gave 
the Young Hegelian style his own distinct personal twist, character-
ized by the use of nastily amusing analogies and a practical, anti-
idealist, almost cynical take on politics, two characteristics that 
would become a permanent feature of his political writings. (p. 83)
But Sperber does not directly address the origins of this change in 
style, being far more preoccupied with the genealogy of Marx’s ideas than 
with the mode of their expression.   This is unfortunate, because we have 
not just to delineate, as Sperber does with great care, which authors influ-
enced Marx in which particular order, but also to try to explain why he 
chose to be influenced by some and not by others.   What explains the ap-
peal of what he found ‘congenial’?  Sperber provides some useful hints on 
this matter in his very full account of Marx’s upbringing, but the threads 
are not drawn together very tightly.   How might this best be done? 
We can glean much from certain phrases scattered through Sperber’s 
account, including references to Marx as a ‘self-assertive young man’ (p. 37) 
when he left home to embark on university life in 1835, and to his ‘impetuous 
bearing’ (p. 41) which initially frightened his future wife.   Taken together 
they speak of an individual who found self-restraint extremely difficult, 
and any restraint imposed by the outside world well-nigh insupportable, 
an itch that could rapidly bring the sufferer close to frenzy.   Such external 
restraints presented themselves in several forms.
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The most troublesome, and hence the one against which Marx kicked 
most consistently and most vigorously, was that of religion, and more espe-
cially, religious authority.   As Masaryk notes,
Whenever Marx has occasion to speak of religion, of the 
Church, or of a particular clergyman (such as Malthus!), he cannot 
help giving vent to his anger and hate.   Precisely this anger and ha-
tred of religion are most characteristic.   As for most atheists, athe-
ism for Marx and Engels is a revolutionary atheism. (1972, p. 299)
It is not easy to find anything in Sperber’s account of Marx’s adoles-
cence and early adulthood that can convincingly account for this.   Sperber 
rightly dismisses (p. 17) the argument that Marx resented his father Hein-
rich’s conversion from Christianity to Judaism as any kind of betrayal, and 
his account of Marx’s upbringing suggest that the Marx family’s new faith 
did not impose any great burdens on their second son.   Quite the contrary; 
the temperature of the ‘intellectual nexus’ of ‘Protestantism, religious ratio-
nalism, and the Enlightenment’ which Heinrich embraced and which con-
stituted ‘the spirit in which the young Karl Marx was raised’ (p. 63) was tep-
id at best.   But then there was his mother, and about her Sperber has much 
of interest to tell us.   Henriette Presburg’s marriage to Heinrich Marx was 
likely an arranged one, and her Dutch upbringing did not fit her well for life 
in the Franco-German surroundings of Trier where Karl was born in 1818. 
She had brought with her from Holland a ‘very household-oriented version 
of female Jewish piety’, and did not take kindly to her husband’s abandon-
ment of the faith, a calculated decision that was likely taken around the end 
of 1819 and purely for self-interested reasons of career advancement. 
Henriette was evidently reluctant to convert, and held out on 
the conversion of her children as well.   Karl Marx was only bap-
tized in 1824, five years after his father; Henriette finally accepted 
her baptism the following year. (p. 23)
Sperber is understandably reluctant to be drawn on the degree of ‘re-
ligious tension’ that this may have caused between husband and wife, but 
the questions of how that ‘female Jewish piety’ manifested itself before 
1824 and what happened to it after that date remain important ones.   For 
the demands of religious piety and its corollaries, individual humility and 
submission to authority, were clearly anathema to the adult Karl Marx and 
provoked in him the most furious outbursts of contempt.3  If his mother had 
imposed and perhaps continued to try to impose, either in secret or openly, 
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any of the restrictions of piety, that could account for much of what Sperber 
notes about the relationship between Marx and his parents.
Henriette…has not had a good press from historians and biog-
raphers.   They have taken their cues from Karl Marx himself, who 
was very much his father’s son.   Years after his death, his daughter 
Eleanor reported that her father was deeply devoted to his own fa-
ther’s memory and never tired of speaking of him.   He always car-
ried around with him a daguerreotype of Heinrich, which the fam-
ily placed with Karl Marx in his grave.   There is no mention of Karl 
keeping a picture of his mother with him.   Quite the opposite; he 
got along badly with her, seeing her as a philistine, with no interest 
in intellectual questions, quarrelling constantly with her over his 
inheritance and showing little emotion at the news of her death. (pp. 
21–22)
However exactly it happened, acceptance of meaningful religious re-
straints on his behaviour went early with Marx.   The next barrier to fall 
was the belief that there were any restraints on his own capacities.   Here 
the crucial encounter was with the writings of Hegel, something which 
occurred not long after Marx began his legal studies at the University of 
Berlin in 1836.   Hegel was irresistible to Marx because he offered him the il-
lusion, so attractive to his self-conceit, that he could understand everything, 
that there were no bounds whatsoever to his intellect.   As Sperber says,
…Hegel saw philosophy as an imperialist branch of knowl-
edge, incorporating all others, its methods and conclusions being 
reproduced in these other forms on knowledge and also affirming 
them…A second point…was Hegel’s understanding of his philo-
sophical system as self-proving.   If Hegel could represent his phi-
losophy as the culmination of the systematic development through-
out history of the highest forms of human intellect in philosophical 
reasoning, then this proved that his philosophy was the culmina-
tion of all previous philosophical reasoning.   Self-consciousness 
became the highest form of proof for Hegel and his followers. (p. 51)
An utterly self-deceiving self-consciousness, of course, but the point 
is that Hegelianism allowed Marx to conceive of himself, quite literally, as 
3.   It is worth noting in this context Marx’s confession to Arnold Ruge in 1843 that ‘the “Isra-
elite faith is repulsive to me”’ (p. 129).
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a ‘know-it-all’,4 and this was a self-conception that was never to leave him, 
even after he had turned his Hegelian weapons against the master himself 
and against his chief disciples, most notably Feuerbach (whose spirit, while 
it aspired to godlessness, was swathed in an atheistic cloak whose fibers 
still retained enough of the incense of piety to offend Marx’s very sensitive 
nostrils).   Marx’s philosophy was in its origins and in its every expression 
imperialist, only with Marx himself rather than Hegel as Caesar (and its ab-
solutist pretentions fitted it perfectly for the role of the ruling ideology in a 
totalitarian regime). 
The constraints of religious and intellectual authority may have been 
swept aside with relative ease, but Marx’s road to his own apotheosis was 
still not barrier-free.   For one thing, the unbridled philosopher had still to 
eat and, even worse, so did the young lady he wished to marry.   Given that 
he held the keys to understanding the entire world in his hands, much the 
most attractive solution for Marx was to ignore the constraints of earning a 
living and simply appropriate the financial resources he needed; hence his 
bitter and unavailing fight with his mother for his inheritance immediately 
after his father died in 1838.   That event at least released Karl from any 
further need to comply with Heinrich’s preference for his able son to fol-
low him into a legal career, and the academic world seemed to offer itself as 
the best alternative to an unearned income.   But university appointments 
required political sanction from the authorities in Berlin, and Sperber ex-
plains very clearly how the Young Hegelianism that Marx shared with his 
mentor, Bruno Bauer, was to rule this out completely once Friedrich Wil-
helm IV ascended to the Prussian throne in 1840.   Journalism was the next 
recourse, and here for once Marx did briefly attempt some form of compro-
mise (in his own eyes, at least), trying to placate the Prussian government 
to a limited extent during his brief stint as a member of the editorial staff 
of the Rhineland News in 1842–3.   It did not work.   The Prussian monarchy 
closed the newspaper from which Marx derived his income, and from that 
time down to the revolutions of 1848–9 Marx had the overthrow of that gov-
ernment firmly in his sights.   And that meant moving somewhere outside 
the reach of his declared enemy. 
For Masaryk, the experience of exile also helps to account for the viru-
4.  Marx used this very phrase in a typically vitriolic attack on the Prussian government in a 
leading article in the New Rhineland News in August 1848, sarcastically reminding all his read-
ers of how the many chances they had had to ‘admire’ in Prussian officials ‘this incomparable, 
pretentious know-it-all attitude, this union of narrowness and infallibility, this crudeness that 
tolerates no contradiction!’ (p. 234).  As a self-description this could scarcely be bettered, but 
Marx was just as blind to his own nature as was the object of his scorn here — which goes far 
to explaining the astonishing wealth of ironies embedded in the story of his life.
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lence of Marx’s anger.   He draws our attention to the fact that Marx was to 
spend most of the remainder of his life cut off from his native land (and in 
one telling anecdote, Sperber reminds us (pp. 494–5) that Marx was proud 
of his country, enthusiastically ‘praising German Wissenschaft and German 
music’ in a drunken confrontation with English “snobs” in a London pub in 
the 1850s).   Masaryk felt that this circumstance does much to explain what 
Marx became.
In Marx I have always been taken aback by his strange blind-
ness to important facts and important social forces…His whole 
philosophy of science is equally abstract; it sees only that one side 
of economic evolution, damning or ignoring all else.   This is socio-
logical color-blindness.   Marx is a utopian, dry and abstract.
I am not sure, but I sense something in him that reminds me of 
Spinoza.   Perhaps of Spinoza’s temperament.
At first I was very much disturbed by Marx’s strange sectarian 
temperament.   It is a part of that abstractedness and narrowness.   
In time I lost that feeling, or at least I was able to explain it.   Unless 
I am mistaken, it is a characteristic of many emigrants.   Herzen 
in his memoirs depicts this effect of exile rather well.   A man in a 
foreign land and a foreign context is left alone with his anger.   A 
special bitterness and negation grows in him, sustaining his revo-
lutionism.   It reinforces sectarian absolutism, sectarian dogmatism. 
(1972,  p. 332)
Penetrating and convincing as this explanation is, it is not yet the en-
tire story.   For again we have to ask whether exile was simply something 
that happened to Marx, or whether an element of choice did not remain 
to him, very restricted though his options were.   Did he not in fact opt for 
exile, rather than simply have it imposed upon him by a reactionary gov-
ernment?  True, the alternative was almost certain imprisonment in Prus-
sia, and this choice, to go, or not to go, abroad, was a desperately hard one 
(yet there was, perhaps, a third option; to renounce his beliefs, even at best 
simply rein himself in, which might just have been enough to secure him 
his physical freedom, as it was to do in Belgium in 1845–47).   At all events, 
Marx was not denied the choice, however difficult, of émigré life, unlike, for 
example, multitudes in the Soviet Union after 1922, the year in which Lenin 
shipped out many of the finest elements of the Russian intelligentsia aboard 
the ‘philosophy steamer’ before realizing his mistake.   Marx was at least of-
fered the chance to go beyond the borders of his land, and he took it.   And 
before joining Masaryk completely in his sympathy for Marx as an émigré, 
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we have also to assess how truly insupportable exile would prove to be as a 
way of life.   We need a yardstick by which to judge such matters, and there 
is one available in the form of the recognition that something of Germany 
did remain for Marx once he was outside its borders; he did not face the 
ultimate bleakness of which the Russian philosopher Semyon Frank spoke 
when describing his existence as an émigré in the 1920s and after.
There is no way out, because there no longer exists a mother-
land.   The West does not need us, nor does Russia, because she no 
longer exists.   You have to retreat into the loneliness of a stoic cos-
mopolitanism. (Chamberlain, 2006: dustjacket) 
And another Russian exile pinned the blame for his country’s descent 
into the abyss squarely on Marx’s inability to come to terms with his own 
exile, on the philosophical inadequacies that he failed to remedy in all his 
years in Paris and London, and on the mounting anger that he chose to in-
dulge rather than master, rage that expressed itself in his fully developed 
‘ethic of hate’.   Boris Vysheslavtsev could not help but ask,
Why didn’t Marx deepen his concept of ‘exploitation’ and real-
ize that it is based on the admission of the value of the person as 
an end in himself.   Because the idea of the person is essentially 
Christian in origin and bound up with an ethic of love, Marx found 
all that repulsive and antipathetic.   What he needed was an ethic 
of hate.   Positive values were unnecessary and dangerous for him.   
They could lead him to the ‘sacred’ and force him to bow down 
before it.   He needed a negative value to underpin hatred and 
negation, and he found it in exploitation. (Chamberlain, 2006: pp. 
240–241)
On this reading, exile was not merely a missed opportunity for Marx 
himself, but a curse for those who had to live with its chief consequence, the 
‘ethic of hate’ that took increasingly virulent form not just in Marx’s émigré 
writings, but in his new role as a political activist.   
One of the great merits of Jonathan Sperber’s new study lies in the 
full and sensitive understanding of the context of Marx’s life in exile that 
it provides.   It was in Paris between 1843 and 1845 that he first came into 
meaningful contact with those who did not share his relatively privileged 
background.   Here ‘he met working-class political activists, and spent time 
in taverns both with artisans belonging to illegal, secret societies and with 
members of legal mutual benefit associations’ (p. 117).   Such elements re-
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mained part of his milieu both in Brussels between 1845 and 1847, and in 
London after 1849.   Given that the proletariat henceforth came to dominate 
Marx’s interpretation of the world, it is tempting to view his initial encoun-
ters with existence amongst the lower orders as the essential turning point 
in his life.   Yet, in truth, it paled in comparison to the impact already made 
upon him by Hegelianism, which continued to constitute the distorting 
medium through which Marx sought to view reality.   His concept of the 
proletariat made its bow in one of the essays that Marx wrote for the double 
issue of the Franco-German Yearbooks that appeared in February 1844.   As 
Sperber rightly notes, here
…the working class appears as the moving force behind, and 
the subject of, history.   It is the successor to Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, 
Bauer’s human self-consciousness, and Feuerbach’s human species 
essence.   Marx, one could say, invented the working class for politi-
cal reasons: to realize the aspirations emerging from his frustrat-
ing encounters with authoritarian Prussian rule…Marx’s personal 
acquaintance with the actual working class, with its own suffer-
ings, actions, aspirations, and ideas, was barely beginning when he 
placed his revolutionary hopes in it. (p. 126)
And closer acquaintance failed to give Marx a much firmer grasp of the 
spirit or the realities of working class life.   Commenting on a passage in his 
writings in which Marx recounts his early meetings with workers in Paris 
and speaks of how ‘…the nobility of humanity shines out at us from figures 
hardened by labor’, Sperber draws attention to the fact that Marx was only 
interested in such figures as a type, for what they represented, not for what 
they were.
This distinctly romanticized description of the meeting of a se-
cret society marked a new stage in Marx’s invention of the working 
class.   Not just the necessary instrument of revolutionary politi-
cal change, as he described the workers in the “Introduction to the 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” they were now the group 
whose social practices were articulations of the future social and 
political order Marx envisaged. (p. 149).
And for the remainder of his life they were to concern him only as ab-
stract entities, categories of thought, cardboard cut-outs, ‘instruments’ or 
‘articulations’, fit only for future use in remodelling the world according to 
his vision; he, (and Lenin, Stalin and Mao after him) would never permit 
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the reality of their three-dimensional existence as human individuals with 
concerns in the present concerns to intrude.   They were destined to be for-
ever ‘the people’ rather than ‘people’.
Yet before these imaginary proletarians could take center stage in 
Marx’s mature thought, the tension between his particular hostility to the 
Prussian autocracy and his emerging general thesis of class conflict needed 
to be resolved in their favour.   Here the events of 1848–49 proved decisive, 
and Sperber comes into his own as a guide to the tortuous course of events 
as the collapse of government authority across wide swathes of Europe in 
those heady years appeared to hold out to radicals like Marx the opportu-
nity to fashion a new world.
Marx’s vantage point in this crisis was Cologne, and since the city was 
not in the eye of the storm, while he ‘aspired to be a national figure…Marx 
remained primarily a provincial figure, a revolutionary leader of the second 
rank…’ (p. 223).   His main weapon was a newspaper, the New Rhineland 
News, through which he sought to advance his ‘political strategy…the re-
currence of the French Revolution directed against the Prussian monarchy 
and the recurrence of the French Revolution by the workers against the 
bourgeoisie…’ (p. 219).   The essential problem was that these goals were 
mutually exclusive, for to overthrow the Prussian monarchy he needed the 
help of the bourgeoisie.   The end result was that he fell between two stools, 
switching back and forth between his twin principal backers, the workers 
and the wealthier Cologne citizens, with maladroit timing.   For someone 
who claimed to have mastered the unfolding of history, the outcome should 
have served as a chastening experience; Prussian authority over the city 
was reasserted and Marx was expelled from it in May 1849.   But the conclu-
sions he drew from this did nothing to change his fundamental view of the 
world; like many other revolutionaries he made his way, with his grudges 
intact and in tow, to the safety of London, where he was to remain for the 
rest of his life.   
His years there are notable mainly for what seemed like a retreat from 
action back into the world of scholarship, as hopes of renewed insurrections 
in Europe faded in the 1850s and he himself began to age.   It was in London 
that he embarked on the intensive study of British economic thought that 
resulted in Das Kapital.   He engaged more fully, too, with scientific positiv-
ism, notably with the work of Darwin.   Sperber is right to argue that this at 
best complemented rather than replaced the Hegelianism that still lurked 
at the core of Marx’s being.   For Masaryk, the new influences did not result 
in the achievement of anything like the panoramic survey of the world that 
Marx had long believed lay within his grasp.
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Marx could not finish the struggle. In the place of a creative 
synthesis he was content with a dilettantish syncretism of Hegelian 
pantheism, French and English positivism, Feuerbach’s materialism, 
Darwin’s evolutionism, and economic Smithism.   Here there is little 
new, and there is little life in the inorganic mixture. (1972: p. 360)
For Masaryk, then, Marx failed at the task he had set himself, as it was 
inevitable that he should, and the culmination of his thinking was in effect 
a surrender to realities he had tried so hard to ignore.   
In the third volume of Capital Marx was forced to modify his 
theory of value and surplus value until Engels explicitly proclaims 
legal parliamentary tactics more modern and more effective than 
revolution.   Engels surely made this rejection of revolution in the 
spirit of Marx’s later development. (1972: p. 365)
There was continued activism for Marx in the shape of his involvement 
with the IWMA and the First International.   But for all the excitement gen-
erated by the Paris Commune of 1870, by the time of his death in 1883, as 
Sperber notes, the ‘members of the Workers Association were…aging and 
declining in numbers; Marx and Engels had been on chronically bad terms 
with them since the Franco-Prussian War [of 1870] and the dissolution of the 
International’ (p. 546).    Amid the wreckage there was a limited fame, or at 
least notoriety, to comfort him, but the problem remains of explaining how 
Marx managed to survive such a run of reverses without succumbing to 
disillusion, especially once his health began to decline.   Masaryk believed 
that Marx’s philosophy would have afforded him no escape route here.   
Modern man does not despair only because of poverty and 
need, just as, on the other hand, his anger does not derive only from 
poverty.   This mood has its source elsewhere.   In the head and in 
the heart.   In philosophy.   In Marx himself we can see pretty eas-
ily where this mood came from; he says it himself: from the time 
Feuerbach destroyed Heaven there was nothing left for philosophy 
to do but revolutionize the world.   Faust, too, and Cain, Manfred, 
Rolla, Ivan Karamazov, all these modern titans begin with a battle 
against the supernatural and end with revolutions or their own 
deaths.   Schopenhauer disposed of God in the same way and de-
clared a blind will directed towards nothingness to be the essence 
of the world.   Marx and Engels set up material in the place of God 
and surrendered themselves to blind chance…In a blind, worthless 
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world there is no time or place for love and joy. (Winters, 1990: pp. 
72–3) 6
It is perhaps the greatest paradox of Marx’s life that despite the whole 
tenor of his philosophy, he was able to find love, and perhaps in some mea-
sure, joy.   And this he owed, for the most part, to those closest to him.   The 
devotion and support of Engels is well known, but Marx drew most deeply 
for sustenance on the women in his life; his wife, his daughters and their 
one female servant.   And there was in them a devotion to him that is pal-
pable but also difficult to account for.   Jonathan Sperber gives over consid-
erable space to chronicling the vicissitudes of the Marx family, especially 
in exile, where money, adequate lodgings and the perceived necessities of 
bourgeois life were hard to come by for years on end, especially in a city 
as expensive as London.   But he never really broaches the question of how 
Marx was able to inspire the feelings that he evidently did in the women 
around him.   This question is most acute in one particular case.   Here is 
Sperber’s account (p. 473) of
…the servant Lenchen Demuth. She had given Marx a son, al-
beit one he could never acknowledge.   Wilhelm Liebknecht has left 
an intriguing portrait of her place in the Marx household:
Lenchen exercised…a kind of dictatorship…And Marx bowed 
to this dictatorship like a lamb.   It has been said, that no one is a 
great man to his valet.   To Lenchen, Marx certainly was not.   She 
would have given her life for him, and Frau Marx and each of the 
children one hundred times over — indeed, she gave him her life — 
but Marx could never impress her.   She knew him, his moods and 
his weaknesses and she could wrap him around her finger.   Was he 
in such an angry mood, did he storm and rage so much that others 
were happy to stay far away, Lenchen went into the lion’s den, and, 
if he growled, she read him the law so impressively, that the lion 
became tame like a lamb.   
Sperber speculates (p, 474) that Lenchen’s ‘secret hold’ over Marx 
stemmed from the son they had together.   He acknowledges that she never 
tried to blackmail Marx, but the impression remains of something rather 
untoward about their relationship (aside from its impact on Marx’s wife). 
6.  The translation of this passage differs in detail from that by Kohák and seems to have 
been the work of Robert B. Pynsent, the author of the chapter in Winter’s volume in which it ap-
pears.
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Yet this is to miss the point, and to overlook Liebknecht’s account of the 
depth of Lenchen’s feeling for Marx and his family.   The simple fact was 
that it was in the presence of women alone that Marx was able to restrain 
his anger to a tolerable degree, and so allow the better elements of his na-
ture to the surface.   And there must have been enough of those hidden in 
the recesses to make him lovable.   How and why he was able to do this is 
still the deepest mystery of his life.
But it was, sadly, far from the whole story of that life.   The personal 
devotion of others faded with time, and his legacy became overwhelmingly 
an intellectual and political one.   What was its nature?   Those who try to 
assess it usually fall into one of two categories: students of economic and so-
cial thought, who treat Marx as a philosopher, a successor in some measure 
to Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Mill and the like, and an influence on a 
wide array of 20th century thinkers; and historians, who try to describe and 
measure his impact on events subsequent to his death.   
For economic philosophers, Marx has long been viewed as a central 
figure, even by those who disagree with him.   His portrait features on the 
front cover of the seventh edition of Robert Heilbroner’s account of ‘the 
great economic thinkers’ entitled The Worldly Philosophers, while between 
the covers his analytical powers are credited with ‘extraordinary proper-
ties’, including the invention of ‘a new task for social inquiry — the critique 
of economics itself.   A great part of Capital is devoted to showing that earlier 
economists had failed to understand the real challenge of the study they 
undertook…Marx invented a kind of “socio-analysis” that puts economics 
in a new light’ (1999: pp. 162–3).   Further encomia on the quality of Marxist 
economic thought follow.
It remains the gravest, most penetrating examination the capi-
talist system has ever undergone…Marx was not just a great econo-
mist.   In his graveside oration…Engels was not wrong in emphasiz-
ing Marx’s vision of the historic process as an arena in which social 
classes struggle for supremacy.   Marx taught us not just to look at, 
but to look through history… (1999: 168)
Thomas Masaryk was much less impressed by Marx’s handling of the 
concept of social class and by his attempt to ‘look through history’, but he 
too was prepared to offer praise where he felt it was due.
For the recognition and understanding of the true significance 
of socialism, of the worker, and of the proletarian question, Marx 
and Engels have done much; their merit in this respect would be 
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hard to overestimate.   Marx and Engels presented all the important 
questions of the time and of the life of the masses of workers, and 
led the masses towards a theoretical and a practical solution.   That 
is a great achievement, and one worthy of sincere recognition. (1972:  
p. 334)
Here Masaryk has, as ever, a foot in both camps, those of philosophy 
and history, and his analysis is the richer for it.   Jonathan Sperber’s preoc-
cupation, by contrast, is clearly with events past and present rather than the 
progress or otherwise of the intellect.   As a biographer writing in the early 
21st century, he tells us that he feels a special and rather new kind of obli-
gation.   For as historical figures recede in time, so the danger of viewing 
them anachronistically seems to increase in proportion; loss of understand-
ing becomes an ever greater threat.   This is especially true of a figure like 
Marx, Sperber argues, because of the influence that his ideas seemed to ex-
ert on the course of events during much of the 20th century.   Only with the 
collapse of communist regimes in central and eastern Europe in the years 
1989–1991 did that influence wane, suddenly and catastrophically.   And as 
great as this liberation was for the peoples of that region, it also served, we 
may deduce from Sperber, to set the understanding free as well, making it 
possible for us to see Marx as he really was, not least by restoring him to his 
proper context.   Sperber is very clear about the nature and importance of 
that context.
Recent historical scholarship has downplayed the extent and 
significance of the industrial revolution, observing that conflicts 
between social classes have been just one feature shaping political 
confrontations in general and the socialist and labor movements in 
particular, pointing out the long-lasting and continuing influence 
of the French Revolution of 1789, the key role that religion played in 
interpreting the world, the considerable if complex and convoluted 
effect of nationalism, and the significance of family life and rela-
tions between men and women for the organization of society.   The 
upshot of all these investigations has been to delineate an era rather 
different from our own. (pp. xiv-xv) 
This is an implicit criticism of those who wish to wrench Marx’s ideas 
from their context and treat them as contributions to the timeless realm of 
economic thought.   That way anachronism lies.
The view of Marx as a contemporary whose ideals are shap-
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ing the modern world has run its course and it is time for a new 
understanding of him as a figure of a past historical epoch, one in-
creasingly distant from our own: the age of the French Revolution, 
of Hegel’s philosophy, of the early years of English industrialization 
and the political economy stemming from it.   It might even be that 
Marx is more usefully understood as a backward-looking figure, 
who took the circumstances of the first half of the nineteenth centu-
ry and projected them into the future, rather than a surefooted and 
foresighted interpreter of historical trends. Such are the premises 
underlying this biography. (p. xiii)
More explicitly, Sperber expresses his disdain for those who seek to de-
termine the ‘contemporary relevance’ of Marx’s ideas; both extant versions 
of such “Marxology” are, for him, ‘singularly useless pastimes.   Marx’s 
life, his systems of thought, his political strivings and aspirations, belonged 
primarily to the nineteenth century…more often than not, I am struck by 
the differences…between Marx’s world and the contemporary one’ (pp. 
xviii-xix).   It is hard not to agree with him on this, but reservations aplenty 
spring up when he extends the argument, perhaps in an unnecessary at-
tempt to appear even-handed.
Critics of these Marxists see Marx as a proponent of twentieth-
century totalitarian terrorism, as intellectually responsible for 
the Russian Revolution and Stalin’s mass murders.   Defenders of 
Marx’s ideas vigorously reject these assertions, often interpret-
ing Marx as a democrat and proponent of emancipatory political 
change.   Both these views project back onto the nineteenth century 
controversies of later times.   Marx was a proponent of a violent, 
perhaps even terrorist revolution, but one that had many more simi-
larities with the actions of Robespierre than those of Stalin. (p. xix)
The implications of this argument are either that no line, and specifi-
cally no line relating to the use of terror, can be drawn from Robespierre to 
Stalin, or that if one can be drawn, it does not pass through Marx; neither 
assumption can be accepted without at least some form of proof being of-
fered.   Sperber also seems to imply that Marx had not the least responsibil-
ity, either intellectual or (more importantly) moral, for what happened in 
Russia after 1917, or in China after 1949, or in the host of other twentieth 
century countries where his name was venerated and where mass murder 
became the norm.   Is the assertion of any connection between his ideas and 
such widespread killing entirely unwarranted?  Was it all just some kind of 
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ghastly coincidence?  We have already heard from Boris Vysheslavtsev on 
this subject, and it would be insensitive to describe him as simply a ‘critic’ 
of Marxism.   He was one of those many, many millions who experienced 
what a regime calling itself Marxist could do even when it stopped short 
of killing in individual instances.   And while those millions may not be 
our contemporaries, their questions about the link between the generations 
cannot be consigned to the dustbin of history.   Some more rigorous attempt 
to assess Marx’s legacy is surely required, and while it is understandable 
that Jonathan Sperber does not offer an extended one in the context of a bi-
ography, it is a matter of regret that his final chapter, entitled ‘The Icon’ (a 
strangely unsuitable epithet for an atheist) is so short.   What else might it 
have contained?
A key question is how far one can separate the man from the subse-
quent movement(s), Marx from Marxism, and more specifically Marx from 
Marxism-Leninism or Bolshevism.   Nor is distance in time necessarily 
an advantage to us here; indeed, the reverse may be true.   Through his 
involvement with the Czech Legion, Thomas Masaryk was the closest of 
observers of the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 and its immediate 
aftermath.   He was, as he tells us, ‘an eyewitness of the Bolshevist move-
ment at Petrograd, and had seen it spread to Moscow and Kiev’, and subse-
quently he ‘had lived for six months under the Bolshevist régime and had 
noted its growth and evolution’ (1927: pp. 174, 178).   Based on the evidence 
of his own eyes as well as his enormously extensive reading, he gave it as 
his considered judgment that,
In point of fact, the Bolshevists stand nearer to Bakunin than to 
Marx, or follow Marx in his first revolutionary period — 1848 — be-
fore his Socialist doctrine had been worked out.   To Bakunin they 
could appeal in justification of their avowed Jesuitism and Machia-
vellism.   To him they were drawn by their secrecy — which had 
become to them, as conspirators, a second nature, — and by their 
striving for power, for dictatorship.   To seize power and to hold it 
was their first aim.   People who believe that they have reached the 
highest and ultimate degree of development, who think they have 
gained infallible knowledge of the whole organization of society, 
cease to trouble about progress and perfectibility, and have one 
chief and only aim — how to keep their power and position. (1927: 
pp. 181–2)
These may be rather fine distinctions, especially given Marx’s friend-
ship with Bakunin that lasted from the 1840s until 1864.   It is true that, as 
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Sperber notes (pp. 372–4), their relationship broke down completely over the 
question of the role of secret societies in bringing about revolution, but this 
was a dispute about means rather than ends.   One has to ask why it would 
have been from Bakunin rather than Marx that the Bolshevists derived their 
belief that they possessed ‘infallible knowledge of the whole organization 
of society.’  Was this not the gift of Hegel to Marx, and when did he ever re-
nounce it?  
Nonetheless, Lenin, like Bakunin and unlike the Marx of the 1860s, did 
espouse secrecy and did promote the role of a conspiratorial party as the 
revolutionary vanguard, and those who seek to downplay Marx’s influence 
over events in Russia after 1917 have often turned the spotlight onto Lenin 
when accounting for Bolshevik totalitarianism and its consequent murder-
ousness, a murderousness that amounted to what R. J. Rummel has termed 
‘democide.’  By his calculations, ‘Probably 61,911,000 people, 54,769,000 of 
them citizens, have been murdered by the Communist Party — the govern-
ment — of the Soviet Union’ between 1917 and 1987 (1996: p. 1).5   His ac-
count of the origins of that Party divides the responsibility for its existence 
along fairly conventional lines.
[Its] philosophy is a universal perspective, at once a theory 
about reality (dialectical materialism), about man in society (histori-
cal materialism), about the best society (communism), about an [sic] 
implementing public policy (a socialist dictatorship of the proletari-
at), and about political tactics (revolution, vanguard, party, etc.) …
The theoretical part of this communist ideology was first de-
veloped in the works of the nineteenth-century philosopher and 
political economist Karl Marx and his followers.   Lenin, both a 
philosopher and a political revolutionary, added a political program 
and tactics.   Lenin’s peculiar brand of communism became known 
as Bolshevism before and for decades after he successfully seized 
power in Russia. (1996: pp. 12–14)
Walter Laquer, though, looking back over the entire course of the his-
tory of the Soviet Union, seems to set Marx’s role at something of a discount 
and fixes his gaze more firmly on Lenin as the author of Bolshevism, noting 
that in Europe generally,
5.  Then there is the issue of China under communism, where Rummel believes that the fig-
ure for democide between 1949 and 1987 may be of the order of 35,000,000 (1994: p. 100).  And 
there is Cambodia and the rest.
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…the overwhelming majority of socialists were democrats and 
had misgivings about a revolution that would bring a dictator (or 
a group of little dictators) to power.   True, Marx had written in a 
letter of 1875 about the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” but he had 
never elaborated the theme.   It was clear that he regarded it as an 
emergency measure, not, as Lenin later described it, “a particular 
form of government during a whole historical epoch.”  Marx had 
even argued that he did not mean by “dictatorship” the abolition 
of democracy, although he did not make it clear how the two oppo-
sites could be combined — perhaps he was not a consistent Marxist.   
Those who gave the issue more thought knew, of course, that such 
an impersonal dictatorship was a mere abstraction.   Political power 
in such a case would not be in the hands of a social class but in the 
hands of an individual…Hence the misgivings uttered even by or-
thodox Marxists such as Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg vis-à-
vis the Bolsheviks virtually from the day they seized power… (1994: 
p. 5)
Marxists did come in several hues, it is true, so delimiting the nature 
and extent of Marx’s influence over the events of the twentieth century is 
clearly a complex matter, calling for the nicest judgment.   One has no right 
to expect Jonathan Sperber to engage fully with it in a biography of a 19th 
century figure; he does instead a very fine job of placing Marx in the con-
text of his times, and that is both a welcome and a necessary service.   Even 
so, it is only part of what is required if we wish to advance towards a full 
understanding of what Marx was and what he means.   We still need to 
grasp more of what went on inside the man, and we need to divine exactly 
how far he was responsible for what was done in his name after his death. 
Yes, Marxism may be to all intents and purposes extinct and Marx himself 
may have retreated to his niche among the economists.   He might therefore 
appear increasingly inconsequential to anyone today who does not live in 
North Korea and who wishes to understand the twenty-first century.   But 
many who felt the impact of his thought on their lives in the twentieth 
century are still with us, which means that he cannot but remain a contem-
porary concern.   The context may continue to recede, but, for some time to 
come, the man will not.
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